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A B S T R A C T  A R T I C L E   I N F O 
This study was undertaken to explore the determinants of liquidity in 
Zimbabwean commercial banks. The research paper was motivated by the 
persistent high liquidity crunch currently be delving operations of 
commercial banks. An explanatory research design was adopted to find out 
variables that determine banks liquidity. An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
model was developed after testing the variables for stationary to avoid 
spurious regression using the Augmented Dicker-Fuller (ADF) unit root 
test. Pearson’s correlation analysis was used to examine the existence of 
correlation between the repressors and the regressed. The study identified 
that non-performing loans are highly negatively related with banks liquidity 
signifying that this variable influence bank liquidity to a larger extent. A 
positive relationship between bank size and capital adequacy ratio and 
liquidity was established. Contrary to expectations a positive relationship 
was obtained between loan growth and banks liquidity. The following 
recommendations were made. Banks should devise robust credit risk 
management tools to reduce credit risk, tap into the offshore markets to 
obtain more credit to extent to their clients and the central banks should 
speed up the operation of ZAMCO which is meant to take over banks bad 
debts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
According to the Bank for International Settlement (2009) many banks struggled to maintain 
adequate liquidity during the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis. The same phenomenon is 
being experienced in Zimbabwe since 2009 when the country adopted multiple currencies to 
address several macroeconomic challenges among them hyperinflation, volatile exchange rates 
and high interest rates.The multi-currency era has brought significant changes in market 
conditions and thus the importance of prudential liquidity risk measurement and management. 
A number of commercial banks are experiencing funding risk as they are unable to raise cash 
or cash equivalents to finance their operations either through the sale of money market 
instruments or borrowing from the Central Bank.  
The situation is being aggravated by the absence of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR), inactive 
money market, lack of confidence in the financial sector (resulting in mattress banking-an 
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estimated $3 billion is circulating outside the banking system), uncertain political environment 
and difficulties in sourcing external lines of credit due to perceived country risk. Moreso, some 
of the banks are still failing to meet the regulator’s minimum capital requirements. As at 30 
June 2014, five out of nineteen banking institutions were undercapitalised; this translates to 26 
percent (RBZ, MPS July 2014). 
As financial intermediaries, banks play a pivotal role in driving the economy. Citing (Levine, 
1996)Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) opines that the efficacy of financial intermediation 
affect economic growth. This is achieved by channelling funds from surplus to deficit units in 
the economy. This view is supported by Sarr & Lybek (2002) who asserts that liquid markets 
are desirable for economic growth because; a) they facilitate central banks to indirectly transmit 
its monetary policy instruments to fine tune the economy to a desired state b) allow banks and 
other financial institutions to make money through duration mismatch and c) enable investors 
to participate in financial markets easily by entering and exiting the market easily. 
 However, when banks lack the necessary liquidity to fund the corporate world economic 
slowdown is usually experienced.According to Moore (2009) liquidity constrained banking 
systems might hinder economic activity as banks reduce lending. This may lead to company 
closures, reduced consumption, diminishing aggregate demand and higher unemployment 
(Bemanke, 1983). As concurred by Biyam (2010) business activity is slowed down as 
companies fail to restock, pay for their daily expenses and meet maturing obligations. 
A reduction in funding by banks has seen the Zimbabwe’s economic growth contractingto 3.7 
percent in 2013 from an estimated 4.4% in 2012 (AfDB, 2014). Moreso, capacity utilisation 
has fallen to around 36 percent from a peak of over 50 percent in 2009 (ZNCC, 2014). As a 
result of this economic stagnation a number of banks have been exposed to default risk. 
Similarly, in the US, in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) commercial banks 
were exposed to Asset & Liability mismatch on both Balance Sheetand Off-Balance Sheet 
activities (Brunnermeier, 2009). The result was catastrophic. Several banks went under, with 
the contagion effect being felt world over as the“global recession”. 
This shows that liquidity of commercial banks is fundamental to both the local economy and 
the world at large. This is aggravated by the roles played by banks in the economy apart from 
credit extension. They form the nerve centre of the economy hence the study of liquidity 
determination is of focus by academics, practioners and regulators.  
Studies on the determination of bank liquidity are still very few save for studies such as; Valla 
et al (2006), Vodova(2011), Moore (2009), Raunch (2010), Fadare (2011), Tseganesh (2012) 
andChagwiza (2014). To my knowledge, no study has been undertaken to empirically explore 
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bank specific factors that influence liquidity hording. This study adds foregoing discussions by 
filling this gap in Sub Saharan Africa. Another interest to this research is the unavailability of 
the Lender of Last Resort function in the Zimbabwean context. 
Panel regression analysis methodology was employed to identify the key determinants of banks 
liquidity in Zimbabwe using a case study of NMB Bank for the period 2009-2014. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 focus on the review of related literature, 
Section 3 highlights the methodology adopted for this study, while, Section 4 presents the 
results. Section 5 makes conclusions and recommendations. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. The Concept of Bank Liquidity and its Measurement 
The concept of bank liquidity is elementary in financial markets. It represents a desirable 
function that should reflect a well organised financial market. Gabrielsen et al (2011) define a 
liquid market as “a state of condition when prevailing structure of transactions provide a 
prompt and secure link between the demand and supply of assets, thus delivering low 
transaction costs.” On the other hand, Borio (2009) defines market liquidity as the ability to 
trade an asset or financial instrument at short notice with little impact on its price. 
From the above definitions it can be noted that liquid financial markets are characterised by 
low transactional costs, easy entry and exit and timely settlement. In most cases market liquidity 
is gauged by the liquidity of the individual assets in the market. However, Barker (1996) argues 
that there is no single unambiguous, theoretically correct or universally accepted definition of 
liquidity. According to the author this is so because some of the important characteristics of 
liquidity may change over time. From the views of Sarr & Lybek (2002) in good times, liquidity 
may primarily reflect transaction costs and in bad times, instantaneous price discovery and 
adjustment to a new equilibrium becomes essential.A bank’s liquidity is derived from its 
Balance Sheet. Moore (2009) discusses the Stock and Flow approach to liquidity measurement. 
The former utilises balance sheet ratios to identify liquidity movements within a bank. These 
ratios are: 
i. Loan-to-Deposit (LD) ratio 
ii. Short-term investments to Total Assets ratio 
iii. Liquid asset ratio. 
Vodova(2011) provide four Balance Sheet ratios used to measure a bank’s liquidity. The ratios 
discussed are: 
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    𝑳𝑳𝟏𝟏 =
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳
𝑳𝑳𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳
∗ 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏     (1) 
Rule of Thumb: The higher the share of liquid assets to total assets, the higher the absorption 
capacity of liquidity shocks. However, high value of this ratio may be interpreted as inefficiency 
due to the lower returns on very liquid assets, hence the need of liquidity-profitability trade off. 
    𝑳𝑳𝟐𝟐 =
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑫𝑫𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳+𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑻𝑻𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑻𝑻𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑻𝑻𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳
∗ 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏  (2) 
Rule of Thumb: The acceptable ratio is 100% or more. This ratio signifies the ability of a bank 
to meet its funding needs. 
    𝑳𝑳𝟑𝟑 =
𝑳𝑳𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳
𝑳𝑳𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳
∗ 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏     (3) 
Rule of Thumb: The higher the ratio the less liquid the bank is. This ratio measures the share 
of loans in total assets. It indicates the proportion of bank’s assets being tied up in loans. 
    𝑳𝑳𝟒𝟒 =
𝑳𝑳𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑫𝑫𝑻𝑻𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳+𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑻𝑻𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺
∗ 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏  (4) 
Rule of Thumb: The higher the ratio the less liquid the bank is. This ratio relates to illiquid 
assets to liquid liabilities. The more illiquid assets it has to liquid liabilities the more prone it is 
to liquidity risk. 
2.2. Empirical Literature on the Determinants of Bank Liquidity 
Berrospide (2013) investigated the causes of US banks to hoard liquidity during the recent 
global financial crisis using regression analysis. Liquidity hoarders were defined as those banks 
with an average ratio of total liquid asset to total assets which increased by more than 3% post 
crisis to the crisis period. The author employed a regression framework similar to Cornett et al 
(2011) to measure liquidity risk. The researcher found that stable funding sources such as bank 
deposits and capital are the main determinants of liquidity holding and liquidity holding 
decrease with bank size. Furthermore, in support of the precautionary motive to hold cash, the 
study revealed that US banks choose to build up liquidity buffer to cushion themselves against 
expected losses from securities write downs. 
Bonner et al (2013) investigated the determinants of banks liquidity holdings using bank 
specific variables for 30 OECD countries. Their study revealed that without liquidity regulation, 
banks liquidity holding is determined by a combination of bank specific (business model, 
profitability, deposit holdings and size) and country specific (disclosure requirements, bank 
concentration) factors. 
Jordan et al (2013) utilised the Vector Autoregressive methodology to analyse liquidity trends 
in the Bahamas over the period 2001 to 2011. The author noted that excess reserves are 
PAGE 116| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2014, VOL. 1, NO. 2 
positively related to net domestic assets and negatively related to private sector credit and the 
Treasury bill rate (using the 1st model). The 2nd model showed that all the variables (net 
domestic assets, Treasury bill rate, ceiling on lending rate and real Gross Domestic Product) 
were all significant in explaining the excess reserve built up, except for private sector credit. 
Tseganesh (2012) studied the determination of commercial banks liquidity in Ethiopia for the 
period 2000 to 2011.The author went on to analyse the effects of banks liquidity on profitability. 
Balanced fixed effect regression was used on eight commercial banks. The results show that 
capital adequacy, bank size, share of non-performing loans to total loans, interest margins, 
inflation rate and short term interest rates are statistically significant to explain banks liquidity, 
contrary to Vodova(2011). More so, Real GDP growth rate and loan growth were found to have 
a significant impact on bank liquidity. 
Wuryandani (2012) investigated the determinants of banks liquidity using longitudinal panel 
data of individual Indian banks for the period January 2002 to November 2011. The researcher 
utilised the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) simultaneous equation methodology. 
Results indicate that credit, savings and deposit affect precautionary liquidity, whilst financial 
system and macroeconomic conditions affect involuntary liquidity. 
Fadare (2011) sought to assess the development and impact of Nigerian banking liquidity 
regulations, identify the key determinants of banking sector liquidity in Nigeria and explore the 
effects financial crisis on the banking sector liquidity regulations. Leveraging on theoretic 
considerations, the author came up with an Autoregressive Ordinary Least Squares 
specification. The study showed that in the absence of financial crisis, banks either hold excess 
liquidity or hold liquidity in line with regulatory requirements. On the contrary,during episodes 
of financial crisis banks were found to behighly illiquidrelative to benchmarks thereby exposing 
themselves to financial distress. These results are similar to Vodova (2011) 
Moore (2009) explored the main determinants of bank liquidity and also evaluated the impact 
of banking crisis on liquidity. Using evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean the author 
found that on average, bank liquidity is about 8% less than what is in line with economic 
fundamentals during crisis. 
The same author provided an assessment of whether behavioural models, linear time series or 
non-linear time series models are better able to account for liquidity dynamics during a crisis. 
Employing monthly observations for sixteen Latin America and Caribbean nations for the 
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period 1970 to 2004, the author found that behavioural models performed exceptionally well in 
predicting liquidity trends during the crisis in Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Venezuela in 
both the short and long run. 
Vodova (2011a) studied the determinants of liquidity of Slovak commercial banks using bank 
specific and macroeconomic data from 2001 to 2010. The author employed panel data 
regression analysis. Results revealed that bank liquidity drops mainly as a result of financial 
crisis, bank liquid assets also drop with higher profitability, higher capital adequacy ratios and 
the size of the bank. On the other hand liquidity measured by lending activity of banks is 
positively related to GDP growth and bank profitability, but negatively related to high levels of 
unemployment. The following variables; level of interest rates, interest spreads, inflation rate 
and the level of non-performing loans were found to be of no significance in the determination 
of Slovak commercial banks. 
The same author in (2011b) analysed the determinants of commercial banks liquidity of Czech 
commercial banks for the period 2001 to 2009. Using panel regression analysis, the author 
identified a positive link between bank liquidity and capital adequacy, share of non-performing 
loans and interest rates on loans and interbank transactions contrary to his earlier findings for 
the Slovak banks. These variables; inflation rate, business cycles and financial crisis had 
negative effect on liquidity. Based on the findings, the author concluded that the relation 
between bank size and liquidity is ambiguous. 
Aspachs et al (2005) provides a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of UK banks 
liquidity policy over the period 1985 to 2003. Their study was aimed at investigating how 
central bank lender of last resort policy affects banks liquidity holding. They found that the 
greater the likely support from the central bank in the event of a liquidity crisis, the lower the 
liquidity buffer that banks hold. 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY & DATA 
This study focused on bank specific variables that determine banks liquidity with a case study 
of NMB Bank Zimbabwe. This bank was chosen because of data availability(all its financial 
statements post dollarisation (2009) are publicly available). Following Tseganesh (2012) in 
order to identify the determinants of liquidity of Zimbabwean commercial banks, initially 
descriptive statistics were analysed. An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model was developed 
after testing the data for stationarity to avoid spurious regression using the Augmented Dicker-
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Fuller (ADF) unit root test. The model was tested for adequacy by carrying out tests of OLS 
assumptions. Pearson’s correlation analysis between the regressors and the regressand was 
made. Semi-annual data was used in this study which was obtained from the NMB banks’ 
financial statements for the period 2009 to 2014. The data was analysed using Eviews 7 
econometric software package. 
Banks liquidity was measured using liquidity ratio 𝐿𝐿3  described above. The following 
longitudinal regression model was estimated; 
𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝜶𝜶 + 𝜷𝜷 ∙ 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊         (5) 
Where:𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = liquidity ratio 𝐿𝐿1 and 𝐿𝐿3 for 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 in 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 
 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = vector of explanatory variables for 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 in 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 
 𝛽𝛽  = coefficient which represents the slope of variable 
 𝛼𝛼   = constant 
 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = error term 
Incorporating bank specific variables into the modelyield: 
𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝜶𝜶 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜷𝜷𝟒𝟒𝑺𝑺𝑫𝑫𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊    (6) 
Where: 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = liquidity ratio 𝐿𝐿1 and 𝐿𝐿3 for 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 in 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 
 𝛽𝛽1…4 =Coefficient which represents the slope of variable 
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = is the capital adequacy ratio for bank i in period t, proxied by the ratio of equity 
to total assets i.e.  
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇
         (+) 
 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  = is the size of bank i in period t, proxied by the natural logarithm of a bank’s 
total assets i.e. 
 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆)       (+) 
 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = is the growth in loans for bank i in period t, proxied by the natural logarithm of 
percentage in loans & advances to customers i.e. 
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 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏 � 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇&𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇&𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1
�       (-) 
 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = is the non-performing loan of bank i in period t, proxied by the share of non-
performing loan from the total loan portfolio of a bank i.e. 
 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 = �𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇
𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇
�       (-) 
IV. RESULTS& THEIR DISCUSSION 
4.1. Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 CAR LG LIQRATIO NPL SIZE 
 Mean  18.35455  0.636364  0.792727  15979868  18.63909 
 Median  17.28000  0.270000  0.820000  8983037.  18.94000 
 Maximum  38.00000  3.950000  1.000000  41877499  19.39000 
 Minimum  10.66000  0.010000  0.530000  8420.000  17.03000 
 Std. Dev.  7.655145  1.130701  0.163346  16965553  0.808980 
 Skewness  1.697885  2.573325 -0.500929  0.540984 -0.864128 
 Kurtosis  5.061145  8.147894  1.972540  1.640358  2.477819 
      
 Jarque-Bera  7.232305  24.28654  0.943889  1.383836  1.493956 
 Probability  0.026886  0.000005  0.623788  0.500615  0.473796 
      
 Sum  201.9000  7.000000  8.720000  1.76E+08  205.0300 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  586.0125  12.78485  0.266818  2.88E+15  6.544491 
      
 Observations  11  11  11  11  11 
 
The banks mean (average) capital adequacy ratio (CAR) since dollarisation was estimated to 
be 18.35 percent against the regulator’s 12 percent threshold. Using this ratio to reflect the 
bank’s capitalisation, NMB is fairly capitalised. Loan growth is faring well with an average 
growth of 63.63 percent. However, despite this good performance, the non performing loans 
(NPL) figure is not pleasing. Although the bank has been very aggressive in dishing out loans 
it remains challenged in recovering loaned out monies. The NPL figure grew from a tiny $8,420 
in 2009 to a staggering $41,977,499 by the first half of 2013. The bank attributed this 
phenomenal jump in NPLs to economic stagnation and liquidity problems currently bedelving 
the nation. On theother hand, the bank’s liquidity ratio which averaged 79.27 percent is very 
high. This ratio indicates the proportion of the bank’s assets being tied up in loans. In this case 
79.27 percent of the bank’s total assets are tied in illiquid assets (loans). 
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All the variables are stationary in levels at 1 percent significance level. This means all the 
variables have no unit roots hence they are stationary which is a prerequisite condition to run a 
good regression model. 
4.3. Table 3 Model Results 
  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C -9.461712 2.693476 -3.512826 0.0126 
CAR 0.020429 0.010499 1.945730 0.0996 
LG 0.012798 0.054574 0.234516 0.8224 
NPL -1.58E-08 5.07E-09 -3.119812 0.0206 
SIZE 0.543163 0.140793 3.857873 0.0084 
          
R-squared 0.779521     Mean dependent var 0.792727 
Adjusted R-squared 0.632536     S.D. dependent var 0.163346 
S.E. of regression 0.099018     Akaike info criterion -1.484069 
Sum squared resid 0.058828     Schwarz criterion -1.303208 
Log likelihood 13.16238     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.598077 
F-statistic 5.303379     Durbin-Watson stat 2.274248 
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Prob(F-statistic) 0.035782    
 
The table above shows the results of the regression model. The liquidity ratio (proxy for bank 
liquidity) is the dependent variable which is taken to be influenced by nonperforming loans 
(NPL), capital adequacy ratio (CAR), loan growth (LG) and bank size (SIZE).  Looking at the 
significance of the regressors the author note that NPL and SIZE have p-values of 2.06 percent 
and 0.84 percent respectively. They are significant in explaining banks liquidity. Since 50 
percent of the regressors are significant this model is good. The R2 is 78 percent and the adjusted 
R2 is 63 percent which is above 60 percent; therefore, we can note that the data is fitted properly. 
The F statistic is significant with a p-value of 3.58 percent. This means the regressors jointly 
can influence the independent variable. 
 
Given that the model is good, the following regression equation was estimated: 
𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊 = −𝟗𝟗.𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐+ 𝟏𝟏.𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐𝟏𝟏𝟒𝟒𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊 + 𝟏𝟏.𝟓𝟓𝟒𝟒𝟑𝟑𝟐𝟐𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊 + 𝟏𝟏.𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐𝟎𝟎𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊
− 𝟏𝟏.𝟓𝟓𝟎𝟎𝑳𝑳 − 𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎𝑺𝑺𝑫𝑫𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊 + 𝜺𝜺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊 
 
4.4. Discussion of Results 
The intercept (𝛽𝛽0) has a coefficient of -9,461712. This means taking the regressors to be zero 
we expect bank liquidity to be -9,461712 units. This holds for Zimbabwe since the country is 
faced with a liquidity crunch we expect the intercept to be negative. Capital adequacy ratio has 
a correlation coefficient of 0,0204 indicating that a 1 percent increase/decrease in capital 
adequacy ratio translates to 2,04 percent increase/decrease in bank liquidity. Although this 
coefficient is positive it has a weak explanatory power suggesting that it is not a good indicator 
of liquidity position of a bank. These results are consistent with Tseganesh (2012) and Vodova 
(2011) but contrary to the findings of Berrospide (2013) who argue that liquidity holding 
decrease with bank size. 
 
Commenting on loan growth a correlation coefficient of 0,0128 was established, meaning a 1 
percent increase/decrease in loan growth translate to 1,28 percent increase/decrease in bank 
liquidity. Contrary to expectations this relationship was found to be positive along the lines of 
Tseganesh (2012). This can be explained by the huge appetite for loans currently obtaining in 
Zimbabwe whereby loan growth is growing spontaneously with bank liquidity. 
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A negative correlation coefficient of -1,58E-08 between non performing loans and liquidity 
position of banks was determined. This suggests that a 1 percent decrease/increase in 
nonperforming loans causes bank liquidity to increase/decrease by 158 percent. This holds in 
reality because if a bank fails to collect outstanding loans this scare away depositors hence its 
liquidity suffers. As expected the nonperforming figure is a significant determinant of bank 
liquidity in Zimbabwe in the multiple currency era. Tseganesh (2012) and Vodova (2011) 
oppose these results. 
 
Bank size was found to have a correlation coeffient of 0.5432 indicating that a 1 percent 
increase/decrease in bank size cause the liquidity position of a bank to increase/decrease by 
54,32 percent. This is consistent with our expectations as suggested in section III of the study. 
These results are in harmony with Bonner et al (2013) and Tseganesh (2012). In relation to the 
traditional transformation view a positive relationship should exist between bank size and 
liquidity as indicated in these results. 
4.5. Model Diagnostic Tests 
4.5.1. Table 4Normality Test 
 
The normality test was carried out using the Jarque-Bera test. The p-value was established to 
be 34.64 percent which is greater than 5 percent (significance level). Since the p-value is greater 
than 5 percent, the null hypothesis that residuals are normally distributed cannot be rejected. 
Therefore the residuals are normally distributed. 
 
4.5.2. Table 5 Serial Correlation Test 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     













Mean       0.000000
Median   0.009993
Maximum  0.140751
Minimum -0.180098
Std. Dev.   0.076699
Skewness  -0.708434
Kurtosis   4.618094
Jarque-Bera  2.120132
Probability  0.346433
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F-statistic 0.125305     Prob. F(2,4) 0.8856 
Obs*R-squared 0.648544     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.7231 
     
     Using the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation test to test for serial autocorrelation in the 
residuals, a p-value of 72.31 percent was determined. The null hypothesis that residuals are not 
serially correlated cannot be rejected. For this model the residuals are not serially correlated. 
4.5.3. Table 6 Heteroskedasticity Test 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     F-statistic 0.217235     Prob. F(4,6) 0.9194 
Obs*R-squared 1.391531     Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.8457 
Scaled explained SS 0.748962     Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.9452 
     
          This test was conducted using the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test. A p-value of 84.57 percent was 
estimated; therefore the null hypothesis that residuals are homoskedasticity cannot be rejected. 
In light of these results the residuals are homoskedasticity which is good for our model. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper was to explore the determinants of commercial banks liquidity in 
Zimbabwe in the multiple currency era. A case study of NMB bank was used as the sample for 
the study. Panel data was analysed for the period 2009:Q1 to 2014:Q1. 
The study revealed that non performing loans are strongly negatively related with banks 
liquidity. It follows that as non performing loans rise banks liquidity deteriorates. A positive 
relationship was identified between bank size and liquidity. In line with theory big banks are 
expected to be more liquid than smaller ones. A weak positive relationship was obtained 
between capital adequacy ratio and banks liquidity signifying that in Zimbabwe capital does 
not play a role in explaining banks liquidity. On the other hand, contrary to expectations loan 
growth was found to be positively related to banks liquidity although the relationship is very 
weak. This can be explained by the huge appetite for loans in Zimbabwe by economic agents. 
The paper makes the following recommendations. Commercial banks should come up with 
robust credit risk management tools to reduce non performing loans. More so, domestic banks 
should look for ways to tap into the diaspora market to obtain more credit lines which will boost 
their liquidity positions. The central bank should speed up the operation of Zimbabwe Asset 
Management Company (ZAMCO) that has been established to take up bad debts in banks loan 
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books. The study advocates other authors to look at a comprehensive study which incorporates 
more banks into the study using descriptive survey methodology since this study used a case 
study of one bank. 
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UNIT ROOT TESTS 
Null Hypothesis: LIQRATIO has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic - based on AIC, maxlag=2) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.534114  0.0012 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.582648  
 5% level  -3.320969  
 10% level  -2.801384  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 8 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LIQRATIO)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/24/14   Time: 10:52   
Sample (adjusted): 2010S2 2014S1  
Included observations: 8 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LIQRATIO(-1) -1.243014 0.190235 -6.534114 0.0028 
D(LIQRATIO(-1)) 0.403229 0.142898 2.821806 0.0477 
D(LIQRATIO(-2)) 0.311845 0.166131 1.877106 0.1337 
C 1.059408 0.157585 6.722756 0.0025 
     
     R-squared 0.926088    Mean dependent var 0.036250 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.870654    S.D. dependent var 0.159368 
S.E. of regression 0.057316    Akaike info criterion -2.573609 
Sum squared resid 0.013141    Schwarz criterion -2.533889 
Log likelihood 14.29444    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.841510 
F-statistic 16.70611    Durbin-Watson stat 2.473352 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.009987    
     
      
Null Hypothesis: NPL has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 4 (Automatic - based on AIC, maxlag=4) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -11.76721  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.007406  
 5% level  -2.021193  
 10% level  -1.597291  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 6 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(NPL)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/24/14   Time: 11:12   
Sample (adjusted): 2011S2 2014S1  
Included observations: 6 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     NPL(-1) -4.412539 0.374986 -11.76721 0.0540 
D(NPL(-1)) 4.753869 0.382175 12.43900 0.0511 
D(NPL(-2)) 5.697039 0.592793 9.610502 0.0660 
D(NPL(-3)) 4.090925 0.601383 6.802530 0.0929 
D(NPL(-4)) 7.684411 0.554083 13.86870 0.0458 
     
     R-squared 0.993923    Mean dependent var 5417320. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.969616    S.D. dependent var 7437574. 
S.E. of regression 1296440.    Akaike info criterion 30.86305 
Sum squared resid 1.68E+12    Schwarz criterion 30.68952 
Log likelihood -87.58915    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.16838 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.139613    
     
      
Null Hypothesis: SIZE has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on AIC, maxlag=1) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.372984  0.0006 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.297073  
 5% level  -3.212696  
 10% level  -2.747676  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
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        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 10 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SIZE)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/24/14   Time: 11:13   
Sample (adjusted): 2009S2 2014S1  
Included observations: 10 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SIZE(-1) -0.215933 0.033883 -6.372984 0.0002 
C 4.244584 0.629537 6.742392 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.835441    Mean dependent var 0.236000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.814872    S.D. dependent var 0.191671 
S.E. of regression 0.082469    Akaike info criterion -1.975922 
Sum squared resid 0.054410    Schwarz criterion -1.915405 
Log likelihood 11.87961    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.042309 
F-statistic 40.61492    Durbin-Watson stat 2.415125 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000215    
     
      
Null Hypothesis: CAR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on AIC, maxlag=1) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.581405  0.0067 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.297073  
 5% level  -3.212696  
 10% level  -2.747676  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 10 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(CAR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/24/14   Time: 11:14   
Sample (adjusted): 2009S2 2014S1  
Included observations: 10 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     CAR(-1) -0.720581 0.157284 -4.581405 0.0018 
C 11.23584 3.140814 3.577365 0.0072 
     
     R-squared 0.724036    Mean dependent var -2.056000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.689540    S.D. dependent var 6.828005 
S.E. of regression 3.804490    Akaike info criterion 5.687097 
Sum squared resid 115.7931    Schwarz criterion 5.747614 
Log likelihood -26.43549    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.620710 
F-statistic 20.98927    Durbin-Watson stat 2.886836 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001799    
     
     Null Hypothesis: LG has a unit root  
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Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on AIC, maxlag=1) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -17.28981  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -5.295384  
 5% level  -4.008157  
 10% level  -3.460791  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 10 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LG)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/24/14   Time: 11:21   
Sample (adjusted): 2009S2 2014S1  
Included observations: 10 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LG(-1) -1.113136 0.064381 -17.28981 0.0000 
C 0.924117 0.178151 5.187256 0.0013 
@TREND(2009S1) -0.098188 0.024913 -3.941273 0.0056 
     
     R-squared 0.982246    Mean dependent var -0.394000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.977173    S.D. dependent var 1.145942 
S.E. of regression 0.173136    Akaike info criterion -0.426157 
Sum squared resid 0.209832    Schwarz criterion -0.335381 
Log likelihood 5.130785    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.525737 
F-statistic 193.6352    Durbin-Watson stat 1.732111 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.125305    Prob. F(2,4) 0.8856 
Obs*R-squared 0.648544    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.7231 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/24/14   Time: 11:24   
Sample: 2009S1 2014S1   
Included observations: 11   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.631251 3.522226 -0.179219 0.8665 
CAR 0.001691 0.013307 0.127050 0.9050 
LG -0.002736 0.065533 -0.041743 0.9687 
NPL -1.62E-09 6.99E-09 -0.231067 0.8286 
SIZE 0.033630 0.184471 0.182305 0.8642 
RESID(-1) -0.234515 0.571342 -0.410463 0.7025 
RESID(-2) -0.197474 0.522339 -0.378057 0.7246 
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R-squared 0.058959    Mean dependent var 0.000000 
Adjusted R-squared -1.352604    S.D. dependent var 0.076699 
S.E. of regression 0.117643    Akaike info criterion -1.181201 
Sum squared resid 0.055359    Schwarz criterion -0.927995 
Log likelihood 13.49661    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.340812 
F-statistic 0.041768    Durbin-Watson stat 2.266035 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.999216    
     
      
MODEL DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.125305    Prob. F(2,4) 0.8856 
Obs*R-squared 0.648544    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.7231 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/24/14   Time: 11:24   
Sample: 2009S1 2014S1   
Included observations: 11   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.631251 3.522226 -0.179219 0.8665 
CAR 0.001691 0.013307 0.127050 0.9050 
LG -0.002736 0.065533 -0.041743 0.9687 
NPL -1.62E-09 6.99E-09 -0.231067 0.8286 
SIZE 0.033630 0.184471 0.182305 0.8642 
RESID(-1) -0.234515 0.571342 -0.410463 0.7025 
RESID(-2) -0.197474 0.522339 -0.378057 0.7246 
     
     R-squared 0.058959    Mean dependent var 0.000000 
Adjusted R-squared -1.352604    S.D. dependent var 0.076699 
S.E. of regression 0.117643    Akaike info criterion -1.181201 
Sum squared resid 0.055359    Schwarz criterion -0.927995 
Log likelihood 13.49661    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.340812 
F-statistic 0.041768    Durbin-Watson stat 2.266035 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.999216    
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     F-statistic 0.217235    Prob. F(4,6) 0.9194 
Obs*R-squared 1.391531    Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.8457 
Scaled explained SS 0.748962    Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.9452 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/24/14   Time: 11:24   
Sample: 2009S1 2014S1   
Included observations: 11   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.229571 0.350170 -0.655600 0.5364 
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CAR 0.000240 0.001365 0.176040 0.8661 
LG 0.001295 0.007095 0.182523 0.8612 
NPL -3.97E-10 6.59E-10 -0.602397 0.5690 
SIZE 0.012663 0.018304 0.691819 0.5149 
     
     R-squared 0.126503    Mean dependent var 0.005348 
Adjusted R-squared -0.455829    S.D. dependent var 0.010669 
S.E. of regression 0.012873    Akaike info criterion -5.564410 
Sum squared resid 0.000994    Schwarz criterion -5.383548 
Log likelihood 35.60425    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.678417 
F-statistic 0.217235    Durbin-Watson stat 2.718983 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.919409    
     















Mean       0.000000
Median   0.009993
Maximum  0.140751
Minimum -0.180098
Std. Dev.   0.076699
Skewness  -0.708434
Kurtosis   4.618094
Jarque-Bera  2.120132
Probability  0.346433
